From the Islands to the Stadium: A Geopolitical History of a South American Rivalry

In the Context of the Qualifiers for the Upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup in Canada, the United States, and Mexico,
the rivalries between South American national teams conceal not only long-standing sporting grudges, but also political, economic, and cultural tensions. Today at Agon & Areté, we revisit the historical backdrop of the confrontation between Argentina and Chile, framed by their border disputes and the Falklands War.

(Listen to the podcast in Spanish at the end of this post)

By Sandro Angulo Rincón

Sport remains a deeply emotional human activity, more so than a rational one, and is often used to ease tensions between nations—tensions frequently inflamed by politics and religion. It is a way of hating each other without destruction.

One of the football matches that garners the most attention from fans is Chile vs. Argentina—two countries that, during the 1970s and 1980s, came close to an armed conflict involving their military forces. The next match is scheduled to be played this June in Santiago, although the stadium, date, and time are yet to be confirmed. Without a doubt, the thousands of supporters of La Roja will recall their national team’s feats, such as when they won the Copa América for the second time (the centennial edition) in the United States—precisely against the Albiceleste, whom they defeated in a penalty shootout, with a brilliant finish by their idol Alexis Sánchez.

The Argentinians, three-time world champions, will recall the football dominance they have historically held over the Chileans: of the 95 matches played, Argentina has won 65 times (62.2%), Chile 6 times (6.2%), and there have been 27 draws (28.4%). One of those victories ended in a 6–0 thrashing, on December 23, 1923.

Nevertheless, in the collective unconscious of fans on both sides, the dispute over sovereignty of the islands located south of the Beagle Channel, and Chile’s role in the Falklands War between Argentina and Great Britain, still resonates. The Beagle Channel—named after the British ship HMS Beagle, which explored the region in the 19th century—is a strategically important zone at the southernmost tip of South America. It provides access to Antarctica, boasts abundant marine and fishing resources, and is highly valued for its promising oil exploitation (see image).

The memory of this historical event—and that of the Falklands (which we will review later)—remains more vivid for the Baby Boomer generation, those born between 1945 and 1966, and Generation X, born between 1965 and 1980, than for younger generations, who will only know of these events through their parents and patriotic history classes.

According to Milton Cortés, author of the article Chile’s Dual Policy in the Falklands War: Between Diplomatic Neutrality and Cooperation with Great Britain, the following events stand out in the chronology of the Beagle Channel conflict:

• In 1971, it was agreed to resort to arbitration by the British Crown, as established in the 1902 General Arbitration Treaty.
• The ruling was issued in 1977, when both countries were under dictatorial regimes (Jorge Rafael Videla, de facto Argentine president from 1976 to 1981, and Augusto Pinochet, de facto Chilean president from 1973 to 1990).
• The verdict favored Chile, which retained sovereignty over all disputed islands.
• Argentina was willing to cede the larger islands but sought sovereignty over Evout, Barnevelt, and Hornos islands to prevent Chilean penetration into the Atlantic Ocean through the delimitation of its exclusive economic zone.
• Negotiations proved fruitless, and the Argentine military junta began military preparations to occupy the contested islands—actions that would inevitably provoke a Chilean response and lead to war.
• In December 1978, conflict seemed imminent, but divisions within the Argentine Junta (President Jorge Rafael Videla and General Roberto Eduardo Viola favored a diplomatic solution, while the Navy leaned toward war), along with pressure from Washington (which warned Argentina it would be considered the aggressor if it occupied the islands), led to a mediation effort by Pope John Paul II.
• In 1980, the Pope presented a proposal under which Chile retained sovereignty over the islands and a joint economic activity zone would be created, allowing both countries to share the benefits. Though the proposal failed to fully satisfy either delegation, Chile decided to accept it to prevent Argentina from introducing modifications.
• Nationalist measures by the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army, General Leopoldo Galtieri, further heightened tensions. On April 28, 1981, he closed the border with Chile and mobilized troops.
• The appointment of General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri as president of Argentina in December 1981 further worsened the situation. One of his first actions was to withdraw from the 1972 General Treaty of Dispute Resolution.
• On November 29, 1984, the foreign ministers of Argentina, Dante Caputo, and Chile, Jaime del Valle, signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which definitively established the border between the two nations, from the Beagle Channel to Cape Horn.
• The papal proposal, which granted the islands north of the channel to Argentina and those south of the channel to Chile, and conferred navigation rights to both nations, was widely supported by the Argentine population in a plebiscite organized by the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989).

However, during the 1970s, Chileans feared that Argentina—with its superior military capability—might use force to annex all the islands in the Beagle Channel. That is why, when Argentine forces seized control of the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982, the Chilean government deployed a dual diplomatic strategy. On one hand, it publicly advocated before the UN for a negotiated resolution to the conflict between Argentina and Great Britain, while on the other, it covertly supported the British in their efforts to win the war.

The justification for this latter strategy was based on the fact that on April 2, 1982, the military government of Galtieri (1981–1982) declared before a crowd gathered at the Casa Rosada: “Today, April 2, we have just begun our efforts to recover the Malvinas and their entire area of influence,” to which the crowd responded with highly emotional nationalist chants, reminiscent of those heard in football stadiums across the land of the pampas. One such chant went: “Tero, tero, tero, tero, tero, tero, tero / Today it’s the English, tomorrow it’s the Chileans.” Another chant heard that day was: “Palo, palo, palo, bonito palo e’ / Eeeeh, Pinochet better watch out.”

Source: Prisma Archive, April 2, 1982. (This chronicle is accompanied by this video, which belongs to the digital platform of the Historical Archive of RTA, ensuring universal access, via the internet, to the material broadcast and/or recorded by Radio Nacional and Argentine Public Television. The full archive is available on its official YouTube channel, Archivo Histórico de RTA).

Galtieri aimed to win popular support and divert attention from human rights violations. His political project also sought to integrate Argentina into the international capitalist system in order to ensure sustained economic growth. Although the Falkland Islands (or Islas Malvinas in Spanish) are geographically much closer to Argentina, they are currently a British Overseas Territory (see map). Their value lies in the prospects for oil and gas exploitation in the Falklands Basin, as well as in the region’s rich fishing grounds and potential for krill extraction—a marine crustacean similar to shrimp.

Pinochet and the military junta aimed to curry favor with Great Britain and the United States so that both countries would ease international pressure on Chile to transition peacefully toward democracy and stop violating human rights. As Alessandro Santoni and Sebastián Sánchez affirm in Chile’s “Friends”: The Pinochet Regime and Thatcher’s Great Britain (1979–1988), although the Chilean dictatorship proclaimed neutrality in the conflict—unlike most Latin American nations, including Brazil, which supported the Argentinians (with the exception of Colombia)—in reality, it assisted the British by sharing military intelligence, providing logistical support, and granting access to its ports. Chile even deployed troops near the border to force the Argentine army to divert attention and monitor its neighbors’ suspicious movements.

Chile only received weapons sold at low cost by Great Britain, as prior to the Falklands War, U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) had strained relations by pressuring for free elections, and Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), toward the end of his term, supported the political opposition in hopes of a negotiated transition.

The Falklands War ended on June 14 with the surrender of Argentine forces and the British reoccupation of the islands. According to Carlos Moneta in The Falklands Conflict: Some Considerations on Its Effects in the Regional and International Context, Galtieri later admitted that he had not expected a British military response—or at the very least, thought it would be limited and aimed at strengthening London’s negotiating position. Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, led the military response against the Argentinians. Nicknamed the “Iron Lady” for the resolve with which she confronted the war and took on domestic unions, she implemented a program of privatizations and public spending cuts inspired by neoliberal and monetarist policies. In her memoir The Downing Street Years (1993, p. 237), Thatcher states: “I am not prepared to comment on the extent of Chilean assistance, but I am in no doubt that it was of great value to us.”

During the war, the language of sports journalism came into play, fueling mass nationalism through football—especially relevant as it is the most widely followed sport in both nations. In Argentina, headlines read: “We will fight as if it were a championship final,” and “We’ve already won the first play.” Soldiers were described as “players defending the jersey,” and the conflict was presented as a “national cause” or a “match for the honor of the homeland.” Meanwhile, the British press used titles like “The Falklands Campaign” (the word “campaign” suggesting a football season), “Score one for Britain,” and “The final whistle hasn’t blown yet.”

In 1982, Spain hosted its first FIFA World Cup. The Chilean national team was eliminated in the group stage after losing to West Germany, Algeria, and Austria, while Argentina exited the tournament in the second group phase after being defeated by Italy and Brazil.

Argentina vs. Chile in 2025

The two nations maintain a cordial relationship, despite their history of past disputes and their mutual interest in claiming part of the sovereignty over Antarctica—as reported by BBC Mundo in the article La histórica visita del presidente de Chile al Polo Sur: qué países reclaman la soberanía sobre la Antártida y por qué (“The Historic Visit of the Chilean President to the South Pole: Which Countries Claim Sovereignty over Antarctica and Why”). They also share a dynamic commercial exchange: Argentina mainly exports industrial and agro-industrial products to Chile, while Chile exports mineral and manufactured goods to Argentina.

The player transfer balance favors Argentina: the country contributes 86 footballers to the Chilean professional league—Emiliano Amor to Colo-Colo, Fernando Zampedri to Universidad Católica, and Lautaro Palacios to Audax Italiano, among others. Chile contributes 18 players: Paulo Díaz to River Plate, Felipe Loyola to Independiente, and Williams Alarcón to Boca Juniors, to name a few.

However, the ideologies of their current governments diverge significantly in macroeconomic policy. Argentine President Javier Milei (2023–2027) represents the neoliberal right, known for public spending cuts, tax reductions for large capital, limiting state involvement in economic affairs, and promoting the free market. In contrast, Chilean President Gabriel Boric (2022–2026) identifies with the progressive left, favoring market regulation and revitalizing the role of the state as a guarantor of rights and provider of public services.

Their styles of play also differ. The Argentine national team, led by Lionel Scaloni, emphasizes precision passing, fixed positions, and spatial control, combined with high rotation, speed, and improvisation. Chile’s team, under the guidance of Ricardo Gareca, tends to play at a slower pace and focuses on ball possession, relying heavily on individual talent to break through opposing defenses.

In comparison, economic indicators currently favor Chile, as shown in the table—particularly in annual per capita income, the Consumer Price Index, and public debt as a percentage of GDP.

However, the standings in the North American World Cup qualifiers clearly favor the Argentine national team, which leads the group of South American teams with 31 points and has already secured its spot. In contrast, the Chilean national team, with just 10 points, sits at the bottom of the table and will need to win nearly all of its remaining four matches in order to qualify.

Listen here in Spanish to the podcast From the Islands to the Stadium: A Geopolitical History of a South American Rivalry.

References

Archivo Prisma. (April 2, 1982). AV-4900 [Auxiliary footage for 60 Minutes: April 2, Galtieri steps onto the balcony before a gathered crowd] [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70ZsgT-n3KM

BBC News Mundo. (2025, January 4). La histórica visita del presidente de Chile, Gabriel Boric, al Polo Sur: qué países reclaman la soberanía sobre la Antártida y por qué. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cr7vdxlg8e7o

Bernardi, A. (2022). El Gráfico y las Malvinas: periodismo deportivo en tiempos de guerra. Dédalo.

Cortés Díaz, M. A. (2023). La doble política de Chile en la guerra de las Malvinas: entre la neutralidad diplomática y la cooperación con Gran Bretaña. Encrucijada Americana, 15(2), 72–87. https://doi.org/10.53689/ea.v15i2.215

Expansión. (2025). Comparar economía países: Argentina vs Chile 2025 | Datosmacro.com. Datosmacro.Com. https://datosmacro.expansion.com/paises/comparar/argentina/chile

Moneta, C. (1982). El conflicto de Malvinas: algunas consideraciones sobre sus efectos en el marco regional e internacional. Nueva Sociedad, 62, 25–41.

Mora, A. (2025, February 5). Estos son todos los jugadores chilenos en el fútbol argentino. T13. https://www.t13.cl/noticia/deportes13/gonzalo-tapia-fue-ultimo-sumarse-estos-son-todos-futbolistas-chilenos-jugaran-a-4-1-2025

Redacción El Deportivo. (2024, September 5). La gran cantidad de argentinos en el fútbol chileno – La Tercera. LT La Tercera. https://www.latercera.com/el-deportivo/noticia/una-economia-mas-pudiente-en-el-pais-vecino-en-argentina-se-sorprenden-por-la-excesiva-cantidad-de-transandinos-en-el-futbol-chileno/6D6WBK53MVB3HCTPLI5AW7QL5I/

Santoni, A., & Sánchez, S. (2022). The “friends of Chile”: Pinochet’s regime and Thatcher’s Great Britain (1979–1988). Revista de Historia (Chile), 1(29), 401–428. https://doi.org/10.29393/RH29-15ACAS20015

Thatcher, M. (1993). The Downing Street Years. HarperCollins.

Vassallo, M. S. (2022). Malvinas: voces de la plaza: Los discursos de Galtieri y los pronunciamientos de los manifestantes en las movilizaciones masivas a la Plaza de Mayo el 2 y el 10 de abril de 1982. Aletheia, 12(24). https://doi.org/10.24215/18533701e123