Football and Hegemony II

Transfers, Hooligans, and Financial Viability: The Challenges of America’s Big 5

By Sandro Angulo Rincón

In this second installment, we will be sharing our reflections on the concept of hegemony by studying the connection between competition, ownership, and spectators of the top five leagues in America in accordance with the ranking of the International Federation of Football History and Statistics (IFFHS): the Brasileirao (4th place) and the leagues of Argentina (10), Colombia (11), Paraguay (13), and Ecuador (17) (CONMEBOL). The purpose is to assess these championships and compare them with those of the Big Five leagues of the UEFA in the modern football business.

At Agon&Areté, we present a compelling thesis: The leagues of America operate under a unique model of exportation of players that allows their their teams more opportunities to secure national titles compared to their European counterparts. However, this thesis is not without its complexities. We must consider two key variables: the inherent precariousness of the game and the pervasive presence of clientelism and corruption, which significantly impact the democratic character of America’s Big 5 clubs.

The Analysis

The Brasileirao is a competition among 20 professional football teams starting in April or May and until December, with matches played home and away. The team that accumulates the most points throughout the season becomes the Champion. As seen in the table, ten clubs have won the national cup in this century, representing 50% of the participants in the title race. It is worth noting that the champions are concentrated in cities like Rio de Janeiro (Flamengo, Cruzeiro, Fluminense, Atlético Mineiro, and Vasco da Gama) and São Paulo (Corinthians and Palmeiras), two of the most populous cities in the country.

In the year 2023, Brazil conducted the highest number of player transfers, totaling 2,375 according to the Global Transfer Report, this means revenues of 935.3 million United States dollars (USD). Making of these transfers one of the primary sources of income for a country accustomed to developing top-tier footballers, but whose clubs lack specialized financial and marketing strategies to increase the value of their sporting talent. Consequently, some companies, known as “investment groups,” acquire a percentage of future sales through the “economic rights” mechanism.

Oliver Seitz, author of the chapter titled “Forward, Brazil!: Developing the Football Industry in a Developing Country,” considers this mechanism as an alternative for clubs to obtain short-term money -even if they end up earning less if those players happen to be transferred for higher sums- while mitigating the risk that these players start to play poorly, suffer serious injuries, decide to change teams for free, or that their contracts expire.

Another source of income is the sale of broadcasting rights to Rede Globo, which dominates all communication platforms in the country and is a leader in audience ratings on both open and closed television. Seitz asserts that the money this network provides to the teams is usually lower than that of European markets due to its near monopoly on media. Similarly,  rival networks lack the political influence and technological infrastructure that Rede Globo has. Thus, the values of the broadcasting rights are maintained at a level that is more in the interests of the buyer (Rede Globo) than the seller.

A unique aspect of the Brasileirao is that most clubs are non-profit and owned by their board members. This grassroots ownership model means that thousands of fans, often without receiving a salary, choose or are elected as presidents or members of their boards of directors. However, this system has its drawbacks. People who run for these positions sometimes do so without a deep understanding of management, promising titles at the expense of the economic health of the sports organization. Despite attempts to compel clubs to adopt more financially viable practices, such as the Zico Law and the Pelé Law, there has not been any success, which highlights the complex financial challenges these clubs face.

In the first government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2007), the Timemania, a state lottery, was created to distribute its benefits to clubs in crisis and help reduce their debts, much of which was related to the non-payment of taxes to the Brazilian Tax Administration Superintendence.

The current Argentine league is played in two formats. The Copa de la Liga has a shorter format where the 28 first-division teams are divided into two groups. Then, the top four advance to the quadrangular phase, and from this stage, single matches are played on neutral ground until the final. In contrast, the Liga Profesional consists of a tournament where all teams play against each other throughout the season, and the team with the most points at the end is the champion.

One of the key criticisms of the Argentine league’s dual format is the number of teams in the competition, which currently stands at 28. This has led to concerns among some executives and former players about the impact on game quality. The argument is that teams with low or average performance, not ready for the first division, are participating, leading to logistical, health, and economic issues due to increased travel and player fatigue.

In this century, there have only been 28 clubs. At other times, there have been 20 or a few more, so an average of 23 has been considered to analyze the options for winning titles. In this way, the Argentinian league produces the most different champions per season: 15 (65.2% of the 23 participants, on average). With two tournaments per year (which would add up to 46 seasons in this century), the number of contenders for the cup would be higher. However, compared to the 23 seasons of the European league from 2011 to 2023, there were 12 (52.17%) winning teams, demonstrating the democratic and balanced trend of the Argentinian league.

If we take the original value of the 15 winners in the 46 seasons of the 21st century, six teams are based in Buenos Aires, the capital, and the rest are distributed throughout the country. According to the Global Transfer Report, Argentina ranked second with 1078 international transfers, representing 509.7 million United States dollars (USD) in revenues.

Another aspect to highlight is the collective ownership of clubs, where fans/members can vote to elect presidents and boards of directors. However, in the article “Football, clientelism and Corruption in Argentina: An Anthropological Inquiry” Eugenio Paradiso emphasizes that this democratic nature has often resulted in corrupt, clientelist, and violent relationships among candidates for club leadership positions, politicians, and the fan bases, known as hooligans or ultras. This drama in Argentine football unfolds in two acts: (1) candidates for these positions offer gifts or bribes so that hooligan leaders persuade fans/members to vote for them, and (2) hooligan leaders believe they have “the right” to demand the presidents or board members to repay “the help” (an unpaid favor), sometimes through violence.

According to Natalia Roudakova, author of the article “Media-political clientelism: lessons from anthropology,” clientelism is understood as “a form of social and political organization where access to public resources is controlled by powerful ‘patrons’ and delivered to less powerful ‘clients’ in exchange for deference and other forms of reward.” It is a cultural belief that formal rules and regular channels for requesting services are less important than personal connections.

Eugenio Paradiso provides a stark illustration of clientelism in action. In exchange for political support, hooligans or ultras demand a range of benefits that directly undermine the team’s economic stability. These include 300 tickets for matches, three buses for transportation to the stadium, and a percentage of the money collected from food and drinks concessions. Furthermore, they exploit the streets around the stadium by illegally charging money to people who park their cars there. Paradiso’s example vividly demonstrates how these corrupt and clientelist practices have become normalized, fostering a pervasive sense of social impunity.

The Colombian league, along with the Argentinian and Ecuadorian (see ahead) leagues, stands out for its unique balance with 13 teams from 10 different cities (65.2% of the 20 participants) having achieved first place. The league’s competitive nature is undeniable. Boyacá Chicó, a team from Tunja with only 172,548 inhabitants, is a testament to this. In Colombia, during the years 2000 and 2001 the competition format used to be the same as the current European leagues, with everyone playing against each other and the team with the most points at the end winning. However, starting in 2002, a new format was introduced, with an Apertura (opening) tournament (January to June with eight qualifiers) and a Clausura (closing) tournament (July to December with eight qualifiers), totaling 46 seasons in this century.

Considering the last 23 seasons to match the number of seasons in the Big 5 European leagues, nine different teams (45%) have won the national cup. However, unlike in Brazil and Argentina, club ownership in Colombia is diverse and unique. It is concentrated in corporations, businessmen, or high-income families with political influence. In this regard, Law 1445 of 2011 promoted the conversion of clubs to anonymous societies, further diversifying the ownership landscape.

The Ardila Lulle group, dedicated to the beverage industry, automobiles, sugar mills, media, agribusiness, and insurance, owns Atlético Nacional; Deportivo Independiente Medellín belongs to the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño; businessman Tulio Gómez owns América de Cali; the Camargo Serrano family owns Deportes Tolima. Amber Capital owns Millonarios de Bogotá through Blas de Lezo Inversiones, and Junior de Barranquilla is owned by businessman and politician Fuad Char, just to name a few.

855 footballers were transferred from Colombia to other countries, which makes the country rank fifth in the Global Transfer Report 2023, meaning 132.4 million United States dollars (USD) in revenue.

Criticism from fans and the press towards the Colombian league is twofold. Firstly, owners are focused on an export market for their talents and on receiving money for the transfer of broadcasting rights, currently in the hands of the WinSports channel, and no interest is put on reinvesting the benefits in hiring good players and coaches to win titles, especially to be competitive in the Copa Libertadores de América (equivalent to the Champions League) and the Copa Sudamericana (equivalent to the UEFA Europa League). Secondly, there are concerns about the behavior of some hooligans or ultras who threaten executives and players in the face of poor sporting results, creating a hostile environment inside and around stadiums, which makes them unsuitable for family enjoyment.

The titles won in this century are concentrated in five teams, all from Asunción, the country’s capital. It is worth noting that from the 12 clubs participating in the current season, only four are from other cities: 2 de Mayo from Pedro Juan Caballero, Sportivo Ameliano and Sportivo Trinidad from Fernando de la Moray, and General Caballero from Zeballos Cué.

The Global Transfer Report does not provide information on the number of transfers of Paraguayan players to foreign leagues. In this century, five out of the 12 teams (41.6% of the 12 that competed in 41 seasons) have won the national title. The format of the Paraguayan league was similar to that of the European leagues between 2000 and 2007. Starting in 2008, there has been the Apertura (opening) tournament from February to June and the Clausura (Closing) tournament from July to December. If we consider the last 23 seasons as in the Big 5 European leagues, the number of winners remains the same: five (41.6% of the 12 clubs in contention).

Most clubs have collective ownership, where members and leaders manage the sports organization, although the trend is towards becoming anonymous societies.

Most football clubs in Ecuador are owned by private individuals or entities, such as companies, consortia, individual investors, or corporations. The exception to the rule is El Nacional, which leans towards collective ownership, meaning that members and fans influence the decision-making of the sports organization. However, sponsorships have a substantial impact on their management. There has recently been an increase in investment from businesspeople in clubs. For example, Michel Deller is an Ecuadorian investor, owner of the Independiente del Valle team, and the Eljuri group, also from Ecuador (dedicated to construction, tourism, and hospitality), owns Emelec. The Global Transfer Report does not provide information on the number of transfers of Ecuadorian players to foreign football.

The country’s league has crowned 10 teams so far in this century, 62.5% of the 16 participating clubs. It has a competition format that has varied over the years. Generally, it consists of two main stages: the regular and final phases, or playoffs, developed in a single season.

During the regular stage, teams engage in home and away matches over several rounds accumulating points. At the end of this stage, the top six teams secure their spots in the playoffs. The playoff format can vary, but it generally involves direct matches between the qualified teams. These matches are played in a series of home and away matches or in single matches. The winners of these matches progress to later rounds, culminating in the final. This intense and competitive playoff system adds an extra layer of excitement to the Ecuadorian league.

The end of the match

This report demonstrates that in the professional football leagues of America, there is a better chance for more teams to win the title than in the main leagues of Europe. Consolidated data from 2000 to 2023 is revealing: France, with eight winning teams (40% of 20 in competition) and being the highest in the Big 5, does not reach the number of winners in Brazil (10/50% of 20), Argentina (15/65.2% of 23 on average), Colombia (13/65.2% of 20), Paraguay (5/41.6% of 12), and Ecuador (10/65.2% of 16 in competition).

This does not necessarily happen because club ownership is more democratic, as this premise only applies in Brazil and Argentina and not in Colombia, Paraguay, and Ecuador, where sponsorship and private-sector shareholding prevail. Perhaps the answer lies in (1) the fact that football market in America is not as coveted by major investors, who create economic differences in the management of teams that are reflected in the hiring of the best players (both national and foreign) and coaches; and, (2) in the inexhaustible source of talent, combined with the export-oriented policies of clubs for new promises of this sport, which produces a very balanced game among those that remain, but not as flashy for the spectator.

This second aspect, related to the export market, is a subject of analysis by researchers from decolonial studies, who seek to unravel and challenge colonial power structures, as well as question hegemonic narratives that have perpetuated the “inferiorization” of cultures, identities, and knowledge. This is the critical stance of Kevin Daniel Rozo in his article “Eurocentric globalization of football. Coloniality, consumption, social distinction, and identities of transnational fans in Latin America.”

From the author’s perspective, transfer and sale the most exceptional footballers from American leagues to the Big 5 European leagues represents a modern form of colonialism. In this scenario, the colonized countries (Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador, and others in America and Africa) continue to supply highly skilled human talent to the colonizers (Italy, England, Spain, Germany, and France), boosting the profits of European teams and providing leisure spaces for their fans.

This asymmetrical relationship in economic theories is related to dependency theory, conceived by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the 1940s. Adapted to sports, dependency theory suggests that there are two types of nations: those at the center producing and selling industrialized goods (the Big 5 European leagues) and those at the periphery (the Big 5 in America) subsidizing this industrialization by exporting, at low prices, the best of their territories (footballers).

Even without delving into these academic debates, the risk of this relationship is already evident: by exporting their best players, the leagues of America tend to be less competitive internationally. The final of the FIFA Club World Cup, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on December 22, 2023, illustrates this inequality. Manchester City, with a starting lineup 12 times more expensive, defeated Fluminense from Brazil 4-0 (see table).

Source: Transfermarkt.com (This portal specializes in approximating the value of players in the transfer market, based on variables such as statistics and performance (goals, assists, interceptions, etc.), age, national team experience, contract validity, injury history, among others).

In addition, fans are deprived of seeing new soccer talents in stadiums for extended periods; as soon as they stand out, they already have the option of being bought by foreign teams for the next seasons. That is why some fans, disappointed by the unevenness of the game, create transnational fan groups and become admirers of the European championships, where athletes with high athletic performance concentrate.

As Kevin Daniel Rozo warns, in Colombia and Brazil there are collectives of this nature that meet periodically to support foreign teams. In Bogotá, Colombian fans of Liverpool have been meeting since 2014 at “El Inglés Gastro Pub,” a restaurant bar located in the north of the city, an area of upper-middle class, whose distinctive feature is its wide range of English drinks and food. In São Paulo, Brazilian and Catalan followers of Barcelona meet in bars and restaurants during televised matches to share traditions, languages, anecdotes, and political issues from both regions.

The role of barras bravas or ultras in Latin America is also subject of debate due to the behavior of these fan groups. In addition to supporting their club when playing at home or away, some of them perform a social function through different types of campaigns to alleviate the contingencies of vulnerable people who receive low incomes or suffer discrimination. Unfortunately, these actions are not often reported in the media, but rather, such groups are usually linked to aggressions, violence, and threats. These latter actions are can be true and automatically generate stigmas. We saw that in Argentina, some of them influence the election of professional football boards through corrupt and clientelist connections that damage the image and provoke illegal expenditures from the teams to satisfy the demands -sometimes violent- of radical fans. Similarly, clubs suffer when authorities in affected countries fine them due to the uproar and unrest caused by the barras or ultras in the stadiums.

A more transparent relationship between these actors, together with a stronger presence of the State to meet the demands of those who are part of these groups, would contribute to the peaceful enjoyment of the game and to the development of the football industry in America with a leading role of fans in its management and control.

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